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Antonio Gramsci’s Dialectic: Past and Present 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
This article considers some of the questions addressed by the Materialistische Dialektik conference 
(30/31 October 2015, FU Berlin) through the prism of the thought of the Italian philosopher 
and revolutionary Antonio Gramsci.1 How do Gramsci’s writings help us to re-think the notion 
of a ‘materialist dialectic’, and, what pertinence might his reflections on dialectics have today for 
understanding the complex layers of historical sediment that constitute a Marxian conception of 
dialectics? 
At first glance, Gramsci may seem like a peculiar choice for this operation. In his Prison Note-
books, while discussing a book on the history of materialism written by the German Neo-Kantian 
Friedrich Albert Lange, Gramsci argues that: 
Marx always avoided calling his conception “materialist” and whenever he spoke of materialist phi-
losophies he criticized them and asserted that they are criticizable. Marx never used the formula 
“materialist dialectic” – he called it “rational” as opposed to “mystical”, which gives the term “ra-
tional” a very precise meaning.2 
Gramsci focuses our attention on the danger of eliding distinct contents of concepts by over-
looking the concealed diversity beneath superficially identical formulations. This is certainly the 
case here with terms like ‘rational’ or ‘materialist’, since he notes (following Plekhanov) that 
Lange’s conception of materialism includes neither historical materialism nor its Feuerbachian 
type. Gramsci’s proclivity for caution and care with regard to matters of terminology is one of his 
vital methodological contributions in our current endeavor to re-evaluate and to stimulate a di-
alogue between various readings of Marx. 
Rather less careful treatment of terminology has led some to regard Gramsci as a ‘culturalist’ 
thinker in a restrictive sense, whose engagement with the tradition of Italian neo-idealist thinkers, 
such as Benedetto Croce and Giovanni Gentile, renders his relationship with materialism some-
what suspect. Gramsci himself conceived the philosophy of praxis as going beyond both ‘tradi-
tional’ idealism and materialism, while incorporating the living elements of each.3 Thus, while he 
shows a willingness to criticize prevailing or ‘traditional’ materialisms, he does not rule out the 
philosophy of praxis as a non-‘traditional’, critical and non-mechanical form of materialism. In-
                                                          
1 I would like to extend my thanks to the organisers of the conference, Stefano Breda and Kaveh Boveiri, and to the 
contributors during the discussion, in particular Frieder Otto Wolf and Alex Demirović, for their stimulating and 
helpful comments on my original paper. I would also like to thank Francesca Antonini for her comments on a draft 
of this article. 
2 Gramsci 2011, Vol. 3, p. 354; Q8, §206, p. 1065 – Henceforth references from anthologies or the published 
volumes of the critical edition of Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks in English, are also given as Q [notebook], § [note], 
[page], in the Italian critical edition (Gramsci 1975). 
3 Gramsci 2011, Vol. 3, p. 179; Q7, §29, p. 877. 
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deed, this critical approach to the search for a ‘new philosophy’ is a strong recommendation for 
re-examining the relevance of Gramsci’s writings on dialectics today. 
Moreover, the historical-philological reading of Gramsci’s texts, developed predominantly 
through Italian-language scholarship in recent decades, permits a renewed and deepened under-
standing of his work.4 Paying close attention to the context of Gramsci’s writings, this approach 
analyses the ‘rhythm’ and development of his thought. With particular regard to the Prison Note-
books, this requires being attentive to the process of drafting and re-drafting that constitutes those 
texts as an open and dynamic laboratory. This mode of study of Gramsci’s writings has produced 
fruitful resources, such as those cited above, but also collective projects such as the Dizionario 
gramsciano,5 that are highly useful for our current endeavour. 
The question of Gramsci’s conception of the dialectic connects inextricably to the wider as-
sessment of his ‘philosophy of praxis’ as belonging to the sphere of ‘classical’ Marxism, while also 
representing an original and innovative development of Marxist thought. In this short piece, I 
will seek to trace some of the sources of Gramsci’s conception of the dialectic, and its emergence 
in opposition to, on the one hand, the ‘speculative idealism’ of Croce and, on the other, Nikolai 
Bukharin’s ‘metaphysical materialism’. I will elaborate connections between Gramsci’s reflections 
on the dialectic and his distinctive articulation of the relationship between structure and super-
structures, arguing for their foundation in his innovative conception of the ‘homogeneous circle’ 
of philosophy, politics and economics. Finally, I will make some brief observations on the con-
temporary relevance of Gramsci’s thought in relation to more recent thinkers. 
2 The Sources of Gramsci’s Dialectic 
 
In his entry for ‘dialectic’ (dialettica) in the Dizionario gramsciano, Giuseppe Prestipino points to-
wards a Heraclitean influence on the formulation of the concept of the dialectic in Gramsci’s pre-
prison writings.6 Thus, in the newspaper L’Ordine Nuovo, during the period of his involvement in 
the struggles of workers in Turin (23 August 1919), Gramsci writes that history is a process of 
eternal becoming, “an indefinite dialectical process”7. It is worth noting the credit commonly 
given to Heraclitus for introducing the notion of the “unity of opposites” to the dialectic, an im-
portant theme in Gramsci’s delineation of his own conception. 
Prestipino argues that Gramsci defines his notion of the dialectic more precisely during the 
period of his incarceration.8 In his prison writings, the Hegelian influence on Gramsci’s formula-
tion of the dialectic becomes increasingly evident. Thus, while describing the educational initia-
tives among his fellow prisoners in a letter to his sister-in-law Tania (25 March 1929), Gramsci 
describes the dialectic as “the historically concrete form of thought”9. These references to Hegel 
become more explicit in a later letter to Tania (30 May 1932), in which Gramsci characterizes the 
philosophy of praxis as capable of purifying the natural sciences of their mechanicism by identify-
ing itself “synthetically with the dialectical reasoning of Hegelianism”10. 
                                                          
4 E.g. Frosini 2010, Cospito 2011a, and Cospito 2011b. 
5 Liguori and Voza 2009. 
6 Prestipino 2009, p. 212. 
7 Gramsci 1987, p. 176 – Translations from Italian texts not currently available in English editions are my own. 
8 Prestipino 2004, p. 56. 
9 Gramsci 1996, p. 249. 
10 Ibid., p. 582. 
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Gramsci’s reflections on Hegel emphasize the concrete sense of history that emerges from the 
latter’s philosophy, particularly his capacity to judge the historical function of superseded philos-
ophies. Thus, Gramsci argues against any conception that makes anachronistic judgements about 
the whole of past philosophy, claiming that: “Methodical anti-historicism is sheer metaphysics”11. 
In this sense, Gramsci is quite scathing about the superficial treatment of the dialectic advanced 
by Bukharin in his Popular Manual12, which fails to present the historical validity of outmoded 
philosophies and to consider their supersession “from the point of view of the entire develop-
ment of history and of the real dialectic”13. 
In the spirit of preserving what he sees as the historical strengths of Hegelian thought, 
Gramsci follows Marx’s The Poverty of Philosophy in criticizing the “pseudo-Hegelianism of Proud-
hon”14. For Gramsci, Proudhon failed to comprehend that it was necessary for “each member of 
a dialectical opposition to seek to be itself totally […] since only in that way can it achieve a ge-
nuine dialectical ‘transcendence’ of its opponent”15. Gramsci observes: 
[…] that the critique of Proudhon and of his interpretation of Hegelian dialectic contained in The 
Poverty of Philosophy may be extended to [Vincenzo] Gioberti and to the Hegelianism of the Italian 
moderate liberals in general.16 
Gramsci re-fashions the criticisms advanced by Marx in the past for use in his own present. 
He criticize the ‘reform’ of Hegel’s dialectic that he finds in the work of Croce. While approving 
of Croce’s aim to render Hegelianism ‘immanent’ and non-metaphysical, Gramsci argues that 
Croce has in fact reproduced a speculative philosophy. For Gramsci, these valid aims require re-
translation into a non-speculative and realistic form. 
Gramsci argues, “Croce’s philosophical conception has to be adapted [occorre rifare … la stessa 
riduzione] in the same way that Hegel’s was by the first theorists of the philosophy of praxis”17. An 
understanding of these two distinct sets of co-ordinates, Gramsci-Croce and Marx-Hegel, is im-
portant for characterizing the nature of the dialectic in Gramsci’s ‘philosophy of praxis’, and 
Gramsci’s intervention into debates on the interpretation of Marxism that he advances in the 
Prison Notebooks. While they are intimately connected, we should be careful not to conflate entire-
ly the relationship between Gramsci and Croce and the Marx-Hegel nexus.18 
3 Gramsci, Croce and the ‘Dialectic of Distincts’ 
 
                                                          
11 Gramsci 1971, p. 449; Q11, §18, p. 1417. 
12 Bukharin’s “Theory of Historical Materialism: A Popular Manual of Marxist Sociology” (1922). 
13 Gramsci 1971, p. 449; Q11, §18, p. 1417. 
14 Prestipino 2004, p. 55. 
15 Gramsci 1971, p. 109; Q15, §11, p. 1768. 
16 Ibid., p. 162n*; Q13, §18, p. 1592. When Gramsci refers to ‘Italian moderate liberals in general’, he is alluding, 
above all, to the thought of Benedetto Croce. 
17 Gramsci 1995, p. 355; Q10.I, §11, p. 1233. Gramsci’s notion of adaptation [riduzione] is related closely to his con-
ception of ‘translation’ [traduzione] between the spheres of politics, philosophy and economics. This connection plays 
a complex and important role in his project for the renewal of the ‘philosophy of praxis’. 
18 Indeed, I will not have space to deal here with the specificities of Gramsci’s relationships with Sorel as regards the 
‘spirit of cleavage’, with Gentile and his critique of Croce, and a host of others, such as Rodolfo Mondolfo, etc. 
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For Gramsci, the relationship between the dialectic in Marx and Hegel is mediated through the 
trajectory of neo-Hegelian thought in Italy.19 We can see Gramsci’s dialectic, in part, as a Marxist 
response to a form of ‘post-Marxism’, namely the aforementioned ‘reform’ of the Hegelian di-
alectic put forward by Croce.20 Gramsci is interested, on the one hand, in the extent to which 
Croce’s philosophy is shaped by and in reaction to the historical materialism of Antonio Labriola 
among others. In this sense, Croce’s philosophy represents an original expression that requires a 
close engagement. On the other hand, Gramsci also regards Croce’s thought as playing an ideo-
logical stabilizing role to the existing political order by providing it with a philosophical basis.21 In 
this regard, Gramsci takes up a notion, originally proposed by Labriola, that it was necessary to 
produce an ‘anti-Croce’, along the lines of Engels’s polemic against Eugen Dühring.22 
Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith observe this dual aspect inscribed in the figure of 
Croce in the Introduction to their Selections from the Prison Notebooks. For Gramsci, Croce is at once 
comparable to Dühring, the progenitor of a “diffuse ideology”, and to Hegel, from whose “spe-
cific philosophical system” Marxism can be renovated and liberated from “positivistic accre-
tions”.23 While these two aspects can be analytically isolated, Gramsci’s conception of the rela-
tionship between philosophy and ideology is complex and articulated. This nexus of ‘Philosophy-
Ideology’ is one of the important themes that we must explore in order to illustrate the particular-
ities of the dialectic in Gramsci’s thought. 
3.1 The ‘Dialectic of Distincts’ 
 
Croce famously substitutes Hegel’s ‘dialectic of opposites’ with a ‘dialectic of distincts’24. In doing 
so, Croce accentuates the circular aspect of the Hegelian dialectic, through which particular 
forms, while they have a negative internal opposition, do not transmit this oppositional characte-
ristic positively in their external form as ‘distincts’. Thus, Prestipino argues that for Croce, “the 
historical dialectic becomes nothing but a succession of pure forms”25. Despite its conception of 
progressive historical transformation (at least at the verbal or conceptual level), the Crocean di-
alectic essentially preserves only the conservative aspect of the Hegelian dialectic. From a political 
perspective, Croce conceals the conflictual vitality of historical antagonisms by reabsorbing one-
sidedly “the antithesis within the thesis”26. 
In the Notebooks, Gramsci assesses the balance sheet of Croce’s contribution, who has “drawn 
attention energetically to the importance of cultural and intellectual facts in historical develop-
ment”27, and elsewhere remarks upon “his affirmation of a moment of practice, of a practical 
spirit, autonomous and independent though linked in a circle to all reality by the dialectic of dis-
tincts”28. The strength of this ‘dialectic of distincts’ lies in its capacity to overcome certain me-
                                                          
19 At the same time, the importance for Gramsci of Engels’s observations on the dialectic in Anti-Dühring should also 
be noted (Liguori 2015, p. 133). 
20 Peter Thomas presents Gramsci’s criticism of Croce as one of the earliest confrontations between Marxism and a 
sophisticated ‘post-Marxism’ (Thomas 2009, p. 261). 
21 Searching for the ‘intimate cement’ holding together civil society and the state, Gramsci famously refers to Croce 
as a ‘secular pope’ (Gramsci 1995, p. 475; Q10.II, §41.IV, p. 1307). 
22 See Liguori 2015, p. 133. 
23 Gramsci 1971, p. xxiii. 
24 Croce 1969. 
25 Prestipino 2004, p. 56. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Gramsci 1971, p. 56n5; Q10.I, §12, p. 1235. 
28 Ibid., p. 137; Q13, §10, p. 1568. 
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chanistic reductions of the relationship between these elements of reality. However, for Gramsci, 
Croce’s conception is limited by its speculative language, which requires ‘translation’ (a very im-
portant and specific Gramscian operation29), from a limited ethico-political history to an ‘integral’ 
conception of history, which would be capable of incorporating the former within the latter.  
Gramsci recognizes Croce’s efforts to “make idealist philosophy remain faithful to life” and 
his struggle against “transcendence and theology in the particular forms assumed in religious-
confessional thought”30. He praises Croce for having dissolved false questions, and for reposing 
them in more stimulating ways. Yet, according to Gramsci, Croce’s historicism remains at this 
“theological speculative stage”. Gramsci differentiates between Croce’s distinction of “moments 
of the spirit”, and the distinction between various “levels of the superstructure” that are elabo-
rated in the “philosophy of praxis”.31 With characteristic caution, Gramsci suggests that one can 
approximately refer to political activity as the first “level”, or moment, “in which the superstruc-
ture is still in the unmediated phase”32. 
Gramsci argues that Croce’s principle of the ‘dialectic of distincts’ is “to be criticized as the 
merely verbal solution to a real methodological exigency, in so far as it is true that there exist not 
only opposites but also distincts”33. Yet, Croce’s ‘dialectic of distincts’ is a contradiction in terms. 
The dialectic is a relationship between opposites, and inasmuch as its elements are distinct, they 
are not dialectical. Gramsci regards Croce’s solution to the problem of “historicity” as a specula-
tive one, or in other words, Croce achieves the unity of theory and practice in a tautological 
manner. 
3.2 Structure and Superstructures 
 
Gramsci’s understanding of the dialectic relates to his distinctive “dilated” reading of Marx’s con-
ception of base and superstructure (Basis/Überbau) when elaborating the relationship between the 
forces and relations of production in society.34 While Croce’s thought advances an effective criti-
cism of vulgar Marxism’s treatment of superstructures as epiphenomena, Gramsci seeks to reno-
vate the Marxist conception of the relationship between structure and superstructure in dialogue 
with the Sorelian concept of the ‘historical bloc’.35 Peter Thomas points out that Gramsci, far 
from dispensing with Marx’s metaphor of Basis/Überbau, employs it “in ways that seem conso-
nant with quite ‘orthodox’ understandings, albeit with significant specifications and extensions”36. 
Despite limited access to Marx’s writings under prison conditions,37 Gramsci repeatedly returns 
to discuss the text of the Preface to the Contribution towards the Critique of Political Economy and the 
Theses on Feuerbach. He indicates that the question of the relations between the structure and the 
superstructures is “the crucial problem of historical materialism”38.  
Gramsci links this metaphor to Marx’s formulation of the ‘ideological terrain’, as the ‘legal, po-
litical, religious, aesthetic or philosophic’ forms upon which human beings become conscious of 
                                                          
29 See Boothman 2010. 
30 Gramsci 1995, p. 347; Q10.I, §8, p. 1225. 
31 Gramsci 1971, p. 137; Q13, §10: p. 1568. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Gramsci 1995, p. 399; Q10.II, §41.X, p. 1316. 
34 Liguori 2015, p. 67. 
35 Ibid., p. 28. 
36 Thomas 2009, p. 96. 
37 See Cospito 2011a, and Liguori 2015, p. 121. 
38 Gramsci 2011, Vol. 2, p. 177; Q4, §38, p. 455. 
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class struggles and fight them out. Gramsci comes close to equating the notions of “ideologies” 
and “superstructures” (in the plural).39 As Thomas points out, the relation of structure and super-
structures is a crossroads in Gramsci’s thought which “opens onto political practice as Marxism’s 
Archimedean point.”40 
For Gramsci, a failure to establish the complex “dialectical nexus” between “permanent” and 
“occasional” elements in the development of “incurable contradictions” within the structure con-
stitutes one of the key methodological failings of the historical analysis of Second (and Third) 
International Marxism.41 Later, Gramsci argues that, “the complex, contradictory and discordant 
ensemble of the superstructures is the reflection of the ensemble of the social relations of produc-
tion”42. The reciprocity that takes place between structure and superstructure in this relationship 
is “precisely” what Gramsci refers to as the “real dialectical process”.43 
3.3 Critique of Croce 
 
The severity of Gramsci’s criticisms of Croce modulates throughout the Notebooks. Yet ultimately, 
Gramsci serves a hard judgement on the transformation of the Hegelian dialectic in the hands of 
Croce and Gentile. Gramsci suggests that their ‘reform’ is in fact a ‘reactionary’ one: 
Have they not amputated the most realistic, most historicist part? And is it not, instead, exactly of 
this part that only the philosophy of praxis, to a certain extent represents a reform and superses-
sion?44 
While Croce makes some effective criticisms of Hegel by questioning the capacity of Hegel’s 
‘Absolute Spirit’ to be immanent within the world, Croce’s hostility to the worldly impurities of 
the political-passionate presents its own difficulties for the coherence of his thought.45 For 
Gramsci, Croce develops a “purely conceptual dialectic”, which would be suitable perhaps for a 
world without social contradictions, but is of a utopian type in the current one.46 Whereas Hegel’s 
reflections on history broached the great contradictions and conflicts of his time, according to 
Gramsci, the dialectic in the hands of Croce loses its “vigour” and becomes a “scholastic ques-
tion of words”.47 
4 The Real Dialectic and the Dialectical Method 
 
A specification of terms might help us to approach the complexity of Gramsci’s conception of 
the dialectic. In certain places, Gramsci qualifies his use of the term dialectic by referring, as we 
have seen, to the ‘real dialectic’, relating to philosophical knowledge of history. In other places, 
Gramsci refers to the dialectic as a ‘method’, or as a “technique of thought”48. Prestipino cites 
                                                          
39 Thomas 2009, p. 98. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Gramsci 2011, Vol. 2, p. 177; Q4, §38, p. 455. 
42 Gramsci 1971, p. 366; Q8, §182, p. 1051. 
43 Ibid., p. 366; Q8, §182, p. 1052. 
44 Gramsci 1995, p. 400; Q10.II, §41.X, p. 1317. 
45 See Frosini 2013. 
46 Gramsci 1971, p. 356; Q7, §35, p. 886. 
47 Gramsci 1995, p. 375; Q10.II, §41.XIV, p. 1326. 
48 Prestipino points out that according to Michele Martelli, Gramsci’s dialectic has three rather than two aspects: 
gnoseological, methodological and ontological (Prestipino 2004, p. 56 n 2-3; Martelli 1996). 
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examples from the Notebooks where Gramsci appears to prioritize one aspect in the first draft of a 
text, while emphasizing the other in a re-drafted version.49 Thus, in the fourth notebook, Gramsci 
says, “The dialectic is also a technique […] but it is also a new thought”50. Whereas in the second 
version of the same note, he says, “the dialectic […] is a new way of thinking, a new philosophy, 
but through that it is also a new technique.”51 The interesting point to observe here is the inver-
sion between the first and second versions of this note. 
Gramsci displays a great interest in the further study of the interrelationship between these as-
pects, in particular as they might relate to the themes of philosophy, technique and judgement, 
‘conformism’ and the renovation of common sense. Gramsci is critical of Croceanism for reduc-
ing philosophy to a methodology of history.52 While this has its merits in the development of a 
technique, the resulting speculative historiography falls far short of fulfilling the requirements of 
an ‘integral’ conception of history. 
4.1 Crocean Marxism? 
 
Maurice Finocchiaro, in his book Gramsci and the History of Dialectical Thought, argues that the influ-
ence of Croce on Gramsci’s thought is so profound as to constitute a qualitatively novel form of 
“Crocean Marxism”. Finocchiaro claims that Gramsci, while conscious of the substantial ways in 
which Croce had influenced his thought, was not fully aware of his methodological debt to the 
idealist philosopher.53 Finocchiaro asserts that: 
[Gramsci’s] critique of the Crocean philosophy of history and politics amounts to charging Croce 
with being undialectical, although […] this undialectical procedure is also un-Crocean in the sense 
of going against the dialectical approach Croce normally followed in his criticism.54 
Despite Gramsci’s claim to treat the dialectic both as a technique and as a new philosophy, 
and thereby to transform the Crocean dialectic, Finocchiaro contends that the ‘dialectic of dis-
tincts’ subsumes the ‘real dialectic’ in Gramsci’s thought. If so, Gramsci’s conception of the di-
alectic avoids one-sidedness in cognitive expressions only at the expense of giving a superficial 
treatment to the real historical development of social contradictions. For Finocchiaro, Gramsci 
subordinates the (real) dialectic of these antagonistic social forces of history within the cognitive 
dialectic (as a technique). In short, Finocchiaro argues that Gramsci fails to render these two as-
pects of the dialectic coherently within the ‘philosophy of praxis’. 
Steven Mansfield points out that there are numerous element of Croce’s thought that Gramsci 
would see as capable of being incorporated into his philosophy of praxis, e.g. “Croce’s ethical-
political approach to politics, his anti-positivism, and his anti-transcendentalism”55. Yet, Mans-
field argues that this is far from legitimate grounds for characterizing Gramsci’s philosophy as a 
form of Crocean idealism. For Prestipino, the distinctive development of Gramsci’s thought 
overall, in particular his conceptions of ‘hegemony’ and ‘passive revolution’, renovates his under-
standing of the dialectic conferring upon it new semantic content.56 I would concur that Grams-
                                                          
49 Prestipino 2004, p. 57. 
50 Gramsci 2011, Vol. 2, p. 159-60; Q4, §18, p. 439. 
51 Gramsci 1995, p. 301; Q11, §44, p. 1464. 
52 Ibid., p. 300; Q11, §44, p. 1463. 
53 Finocchiaro 1988, p. 234. 
54 Ibid., p. 26. 
55 Mansfield 2011, p. 218. 
56 Prestipino 2004, p. 56. 
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ci’s ‘philosophy of praxis’ radically reconfigures this Crocean matrix whilst drawing vitality from 
its engagement with Croce’s lexicon.57 
4.2 Politics and Philosophy 
 
Gramsci differentiates himself with the idealist consequences of Croce’s ‘dialectic of distincts’ 
especially through his innovative formulation of the relationship between the ‘structure’ and ‘su-
perstructures’ within Marxism. He criticizes Croce for maintaining that the philosophy of praxis 
had replaced the Hegelian ‘idea’ with the ‘concept’ of structure. Gramsci refutes this claim, and 
explains the novelty of the ‘philosophy of praxis’ with regard to Hegel: 
The Hegelian “idea” has been resolved both in the structure and in the superstructures and the 
whole way of conceiving philosophy has been “historicized”, that is to say a new way of philoso-
phizing which is more concrete and historical than what went before it has begun to come into ex-
istence.58 
Of particular importance for this “new way of philosophizing” is the identity proposed by 
Croce between history and philosophy. Gramsci sees a number of rich critical consequences that 
flow from this Crocean proposition. However, he argues that “1) it remains incomplete if it does 
not also arrive at the identity of history and politics […], and 2) thus also at the identity of politics 
and philosophy”59. 
For Gramsci, if one admits the identity of politics and philosophy, then one must also accept 
that the distinction between philosophy and ideology is a matter of gradation, a quantitative ra-
ther than a qualitative distinction. For Gramsci, Croce’s “Olympian attitude” of serene intellec-
tual impartiality made it impossible for him to think a conception of philosophy in which a re-
quired “historical bloc” could be realized, “establishing the dialectical position of political activity 
(and of the corresponding science) as a particular level of the superstructure”60. 
This limitation of Croce’s thought arises from his identification of the political moment with 
the moment of ‘passion’, which he imbues with a predominantly pejorative connotation. For 
Croce, ethics subsumes politics, or, in other words, politics is reduced to the individual passion. 
By contrast, Gramsci adopts the politics/passion identity and imbues it with a positive sense. He 
re-configures the matrix of those terms that he appropriates from Croce’s thought. Thus, Gram-
sci is interested in the establishment of passion in its “far-reaching historical importance”, as an 
“organised and permanent” passion, which is inconceivable within the Crocean framework.61 
In Gramsci’s ‘philosophy of praxis’: “One cannot make politics-history without this passion, 
without this sentimental connection between intellectuals and people-nation”62. These reflections 
lead Gramsci towards his rich discussion of the concept of the “national-popular”,63 as well as a 
radically democratic conception of philosophy, and to the figure of the “democratic philoso-
pher”, who stands in “an active relationship of modification of the cultural environment”.64 
                                                          
57 E.g. the “movement of moral and intellectual reform”, “absolute historicism”, “immanence”, etc. 
58 Gramsci 1971, p. 448; Q11, §20, p. 1420. 
59 Gramsci 1995, p. 382; Q10.II, §2, p. 1241. 
60 Gramsci 1971, p. 137; Q13, §10, p. 1569. This is a complex question that merits further investigation (see Liguori 
2015, p. 28). 
61 Ibid., p. 138; Q13, §8, p. 1567. 
62 Ibid., p. 418; Q11, §67, p. 1505. 
63 See Durante 2009. 
64 Gramsci 1971, p. 350; Q10.II, §44, p. 1332. 
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5 Gramsci, Bukharin and Gnoseology 
 
I will turn now to discuss another of Gramsci’s most significant interlocutors in the Prison Note-
books. Gramsci’s engagement with Bukharin’s Popular Manual is motivated by his dissatisfaction 
with the prevailing currents in Marxism, which he believes have failed to advance an adequate 
treatment of the dialectic in their texts.65 Thus, in Bukharin’s Popular Manual, Gramsci argues:  
The dialectic is presupposed, in a very superficial manner, but is not expounded, and this is absurd 
in a manual which ought to contain the essential elements of the doctrine under discussion […].66 
Gramsci suggests that there are two potential sources of this absence. 
The first reason lies in the bifurcation of the ‘philosophy of praxis’ into, on the one hand, a 
positivistic “sociology” and, on the other, a “metaphysical or mechanical (vulgar) materialism”.67 
This dualistic framing of Marxism relegates the dialectic from its position “as a doctrine of know-
ledge and the very marrow of historiography and the science of politics” to a “sub-species of 
formal logic and elementary scholastics”68. For Gramsci, this prevents us from seeing the extent 
to which the philosophy of praxis is an original and integral philosophy, which exceeds both ‘tra-
ditional’ idealism and materialism. The ‘new dialectic’ must be grasped, says Gramsci, as a means 
of both effecting and expressing the transcendence of old philosophies. 
The second reason emerges from a sense in Bukharin that the dialectic is “something arduous 
and difficult, in so far as thinking dialectically goes against vulgar common sense”69. Despite the 
felt need that might exist for a systematic presentation of a completed doctrine, Gramsci argues 
that the ‘philosophy of praxis’ remains in a phase of criticism. The danger of Bukharin’s emphasis 
on indisputable ‘certainties’ is that it disarms the critical elaboration of a new philosophy, and 
simply recreates the metaphysics and dogmatism of the past in new forms. As we have seen 
above, Gramsci engages Croce’s ‘dialectic of distincts’ to overcome the mechanicism of ‘meta-
physical’ materialism. At the same time, for Gramsci, the elaboration of a new dialectic should 
retain its roots in concrete history and the antagonistic struggle of social forces. 
5.1 Coutinho, ‘Labour’ and ‘Interaction’ 
 
Gramsci’s emphasis on the creativity of the ‘focal point’ of political praxis, the autonomy of po-
litical science, has led some commentators to criticize his conception of social ontology as insuf-
ficiently developed. For Carlos Nelson Coutinho, Gramsci's gnoseological thesis of the effective 
reality of human knowledge as social relations leads him to slide into idealist positions “without 
reaching its ontologico-social implications”70. Thomas explains this “politico-gnoseological the-
sis” as a theory that deals with the “effective reality of human relations of knowledge”.71 Thomas 
is modifying a phrase used by Christine Buci-Glucksman, when she affirms that Gramsci's con-
ception neither privileges philosopher-intellectuals as custodians of knowledge, which they impart 
to the masses, nor reduces knowledge to an epiphenomenon of mechanically-determined eco-
                                                          
65 Although, it should also be noted that Gramsci used Bukharin’s book as a model and pedagogical tool in his pre-
prison educational activities for the Italian communist party. 
66 Ibid., p. 434; Q7, §29, p.876-7; Q11, §22, p. 1424. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid., p. 435; Q11, §22, p. 1424. 
70 Coutinho 2013, p. 67. 
71 Thomas 2009, p. 97. 
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nomic forces.72 Gnoseology is contrasted with more epistemological approaches, which view 
knowledge as a type of speculative and passive reflection. 
Coutinho argues that Gramsci was unable to “systematically distinguish the two essential 
modes of human praxis, ‘labour’ and ‘interaction’” to which “scientific” and “ideological” con-
sciousness are connected.73 We might ask whether such a distinct separation of these is required 
on the terrain of Gramsci’s gnoseology, and whether we are therefore in danger of importuning 
the text of the Notebooks by forcing it into the mould of an epistemological position. Gramsci 
certainly cautions against the unmediated introduction of natural scientific concepts into the 
study of human history, but Coutinho seems to imply that this necessarily leads to the introduc-
tion of idealist elements into Gramsci’s conception. This might depend on whether we follow 
Coutinho’s commitment, following Lukács, to science as de-anthropomorphizing knowledge.74 
In the Notebooks, Gramsci rejects the purely reflective pretensions of metaphysics to absolute 
objectivity, but nowhere suggests that he denies the possibility of scientific knowledge tout court.75 
Indeed, as Peter Thomas points out: “Discussions of science – not merely theoretical reflection 
on it, but analysis of technical problems and procedures – are a central recurring theme of the 
Prison Notebooks”76. Gramsci is a keen observer of the historical particularities of scientific prac-
tice, and was keen to identify the complex character of its modern form. This is not to obviate 
the challenges identified, e.g. by Althusser, in Gramsci’s position that “science too is a superstruc-
ture, an ideology”77. Nevertheless, Thomas points out that: 
[…] this statement has a precise meaning: also science is one of the forms in which members of 
classes come to know the struggle in which they are engaged – […] in a very particular and effica-
cious way.78 
For Coutinho, the gnoseological subject is the knowing subject, and it is counterposed to the 
ontological or acting subject.79 However, as Buci-Glucksmann points out, Gramsci is highly criti-
cal of any treatment of knowledge or theory as an “accessory” to practice.80 Thus, he would reject 
the assertion that gnoseology precludes or can be mechanically separated from activity, which is 
in fact Gramsci’s central concern. Buci-Glucksmann explains this conception as a dual process in 
which “philosophical positions have their effects in all practices,” and “all practices contain 
knowledge effects”. 81 
Gramsci recognizes that the dissolution of claims to absolute truth has problematic conse-
quences. In particular, he is concerned that historical relativism might undermine the certitude 
required for motivating decisive political action. Yet, Gramsci’s reluctance to substitute the 
speculation of bourgeois thought for a Marxian metaphysics appears to be well founded. For 
Gramsci, despite the attendant risks, the new dialectic of the ‘philosophy of praxis’ must be one 
that is self-reflexive if it is to avoid reproducing the symptomatic passivity of the proletariat’s 
experience of the subaltern position. 
                                                          
72 Buci-Glucksmann 1980, p. 346. 
73 Coutinho 2013, p. 70. 
74 Ibid. 
75 See Antonini 2014. 
76 Thomas 2009, p. 315. 
77 Gramsci 1995, p. 293; Q11, §38, p. 1457. 
78 Thomas 2009, p. 101. 
79 Coutinho 2013, p. 67. 
80 Buci-Glucksmann 1980, pp. 346-347. 
81 Ibid., p. 349. 
Robert P. Jackson                                                                                     Antonio Gramsci’s Dialectic: Past and Present 
147 
 
5.2 The ‘Homogeneous Circle’ of Politics, Philosophy and Economics 
 
As can be inferred from the indications given above, Gramsci attempts to formulate the real 
problem to which both Croce and Bukharin have responded in distinct but related ways. Thus, 
Gramsci argues that: 
If “speculative idealism” is the science of categories and of the a priori synthesis of the spirit, i.e. a 
form of anti-historicist abstraction, the philosophy implicit in the Popular Manual is idealism upside 
down, in the sense that the speculative categories are replaced by empirical concepts and classifica-
tions which are no less abstract and anti-historical.82 
Gramsci’s ‘philosophy of praxis’ seeks to contribute towards the creation of an integral con-
ception of the world, sufficient unto itself, constituted by the ‘convertibility’ of the activities of 
‘Philosophy-Politics-Economics’ and the reciprocal translatability of their respective specific lan-
guages. For Gramsci, each of these elements is implicit in the others. They form what he de-
scribes as a “homogeneous circle”83. 
The conversion between these different moments relies on the principle of ‘translatability’ that 
underpins the coherence of Gramsci’s conception. As Mansfield has pointed out, translatability 
“is not limited to formal or theoretical languages but is based upon the interrelationship of the 
practices out of which languages develop”, and as such is rooted within a “materialist philosophy 
of internal relations”.84 This principle is crucial to distinguishing Gramsci’s dialectic from that of 
Croce, and for understanding the historical genesis of the ‘philosophy of praxis’ itself. 
6 Gramsci and Contemporary Thought 
 
To conclude, I will very briefly address the second question of the conference: why should we be 
concerned today with Gramsci’s formulation of the dialectic in his Prison Notebooks? Figures such 
as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe have sought to deploy Gramscian concepts to address 
contemporary problems of method and render a dialectic between logics of difference and logics 
of equivalence. However, they argue that Gramsci is constrained by a class reductionism. For 
Laclau and Mouffe, despite the potential of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, there remains an 
“essentialist core” of productivism in his thought.85 Thus, they would suggest that Gramsci is 
unable to articulate sufficiently a logic of difference and the radical indeterminacy of political and 
social identities. Mansfield rejects these charges, suggesting that Laclau and Mouffe exaggerate 
the essentialist logic in both Marx and Gramsci.86 In order to criticize the reading of Gramsci by 
Laclau and Mouffe, Mansfield examines what he sees as their under-emphasis on the dialectic of 
identity and difference both in Gramsci’s “analytic methodology and in his substantive theory”87. 
In this article, I have explored elements of Gramsci’s reflections on dialectics that would sup-
port this thesis and stimulate further enquiry. I have sought to demonstrate that Gramsci’s reflec-
tions on the dialectic can stimulate insightful reflections on the Marx-Hegel relationship and con-
tinue to contribute to contemporary debates on method in critical theory. Furthermore, I would 
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suggest that staging encounters between Gramsci and more recent figures remains a conceptually 
productive exercise enabling us to articulate a conception of the dialectic in dialogue with con-
temporary forms of thought.88 
Although limitations of space prevent a further exploration at this juncture, Gramsci’s dialec-
tic offers possibilities for conceptually productive encounters with contemporary thinkers. A par-
ticularly productive encounter is, in my opinion, the one with the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. 
Gramsci’s insistence on human knowledge as a practice puts him, in this respect at least, in the 
company avant la lettre of thinkers such as Bourdieu, who seek to shift the terrain of the analysis 
of social domination away from theories of consciousness and toward theories of practice.89 In 
flagging up these points, rather telegraphically, I would argue that it is worth re-considering both 
the past and the present of Gramsci’s dialectic. 
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